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Abstract 
Th is paper presents fi ndings from our study which explored the price elasticities for domestic space 
heating energy of households in Germany. We focus upon the diff erence in price elasticities between 
homeowners and tenants found in previous studies in order to further elaborate on this. Using panel 
data from the GSOEP we perform fi xed eff ects and OLS regressions to examine the infl uencing factors 
yielding the diff erence in heating price elasticities between homeowners and tenants. Our results sug-
gest that the diff erence in the heating price elasticities is to a great extent the result of diff ering initial 
consumption levels from homeowners and tenants. 
Understanding the reactions of households to rising energy prices according to various household types 
and initial levels of consumption and expenses is helpful in designing more target-oriented policy me-
asures in order to reduce CO2 emissions. We show that per capita heat energy consumption is highest 
for homeowners of detached buildings which has increased in the past few years rather than decreased. 
Th is leads to lower price elasticities for homeowners in comparison to tenants. Reduction policies thus 
should have a stronger focus on the group of homeowners of detached buildings
Keywords: space heating, price elasticity, Germany, principal-agent theory, saving incentives, refur-
bishment incentives
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e residential sector plays an important role in the German government’s goal to reduce 
CO2 emissions to the amount of 80-90 per cent by the year 2050 relative to 1990. Th is is 
because the household energy demand for space heating accounts up to 70% of the total 
energy demand of households (BMWi, 2014). Prices for energy in the residential sector 
have increased, which raises the question whether this trend will lead to households con-
suming less energy and thus reducing CO2 emissions in the residential sector. 
1 Th is research project was funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research as part of the fund-
ing priority “Research for Sustainable Development” (FONA) with the project “Lokale Passung”. 
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In order to tackle this question, this paper presents the fi ndings of energy price elasti-
cities for domestic space heating in Germany. Building on previous research on energy 
prices and income elasticities for domestic space heating (Baker et al., 1989; Guertin 
et al., 2003; Nesbakken, 1999, 2000; Halvorsen and Larsen, 2001; Hanemann et al., 
2013; Madlener and Hautermann, 2011; Meier and Rehdanz, 2010), we will focus 
on the diff erences in heating price elasticities between homeowners and tenants whi-
ch were found to exist, but which to date were not investigated in more detail. More 
specifi cally, tenants showed larger heating price elasticities than owners (Madlener and 
Hauertmann, 2011; Meier and Rehdanz, 2010). 
Th e objective of this study is to (1) explain why this fi nding is counterintuitive at fi rst 
glance, (2) discuss possible explanations for this fi nding, and (3) test the derived hypo-
theses with fi xed eff ects and OLS regressions. Th is article contributes to the already 
existing research on the topic in the following way: a) it supports the observation that 
owners have lower price elasticities; b) beyond the existing literature, it explains why, 
from a principal-agent theory perspective, this fi nding is rather surprising; and fi nally 
c) it tries to elucidate the causes behind the rather odd observation. Our more detailed 
fi ndings suggest that higher levels of energy expenditures and the building specifi cities 
of apartment blocks engender higher price elasticities, while higher levels of domesticity 
result in lower elasticities. Th e fi rst two characteristics are often found in tenant hou-
seholds while the latter more often corresponds with owner households. Our empirical 
analysis is performed with data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for 
the period 1998 to 2013.
Th e study is structured as follows: In section 2 we discuss why, from a microeconomic 
point of view, one would expect higher elasticities for homeowners instead of tenants. In 
addition, possible explanations for the lower elasticity of homeowners are discussed and 
hypotheses are derived. Section 3 describes the data used and the methodology employed 
for the empirical analysis, and section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis, both 
the fi xed eff ects regression results as well as the OLS regression results. In the fi nal secti-
on, the empirical results are summarized in order to discuss policy implications. 
2. THEORY
Although oil prices have been decreasing in the past three years, energy prices overall 
and thus heating costs for households have been increasing. At the same time the net 
equivalence income of households has increased at a much slower rate. For example, 
between 1995 to 2013 in Germany the costs for domestic fuel have risen about 150% 
(domestic fuel oil) and 75% (natural gasoline, district heating), whereas the net equ-
ivalence income of households has only increased about 40% during the same period 
(BMWi, 2014; Eurostat, 2016).
Households thus have to spend a higher share of their income for energy than in the 
past, leading to a larger amount of households facing fuel poverty (Wolff  et al., 2017). 
How do households react to this development? We discuss possible reactions below. 
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First, it is possible that households do not react at all to rising energy prices. In line 
with Ernst Engel’s law (Engel, 1881) and the fact that heating is not easy to substitute, 
a warm home could be regarded as a necessity good. If, however, households do think 
about reducing their heating costs, they need to decrease the amount of energy needed. 
Th is can be achieved by reducing the indoor room temperatures. Also, reducing the 
frequency or length of ventilation leads to less heating energy being lost to the atmosp-
here, i.e. out of the home. Furthermore, investing in more energy effi  cient technology 
reduces heating costs. Th is investment, however, is in conjunction with high expenses 
when the technology is installed. Also, the payback period for the investment varies 
according to the energy price trend, which causes uncertainty with regard to the ratio-
nality of the investment.
In general, the reaction of a household to rising energy prices can be described with the 
price elasticity of demand. It is defi ned to be the percent change in quantity divided by 
the percent change in price: ei = “% Change in quantity “ /”% Change in price” (Varian, 
2010).
It cannot be expected that all households react to rising energy prices in the same way. Not 
only does the individual comfort temperature vary to a large extent but reducing room 
temperature aff ects people more or less strongly (Wolff  et al., 2017). Especially since the 
diff erent elasticities for homeowners and tenants2 in previous research suggest that moti-
vation and freedom of action diff er in the population and between certain groups. Th eo-
retically, it could be expected that homeowners react much more sensitively to increasing 
heating prices than homeowners. Th is will be laid out in more detail hereafter. 
One important factor infl uencing the reaction of a household is transparency and tim-
ing of heating bills. From a microeconomic point of view, households that have a good 
overview of their heating costs and have direct feedback can estimate the fi nancial ben-
efi t from reducing the room temperature or investing in newer technologies more pre-
cisely. Homeowners receive more direct feedback than tenants, thus they should be 
better motivated to reduce heating consumption. 
In addition, tenants in Germany partly pay heating costs independently of their own 
consumption as they pay 30-50% of the buildings’ heating costs allocated by the size 
of the tenants’ dwelling in square meters. Th is generates the microeconomic eff ect that 
reducing the indoor room temperature is more profi table for homeowners than for ten-
ants. Again, homeowners should have higher elasticities. 
In line with E. Engel’s, respectively Hermann Schwabe’s law, those households that have 
to spend a larger share of their income for heating should have the largest elasticities 
(Engel, 1881; Schwabe, 1966). As owners in Germany frequently inhabit detached 
buildings (RWI, 2013) and detached buildings have higher consumption per square 
meter due to a larger surface-to-volume ratio (sa:v) (Bettencourt et al., 2007; Schubert 
et al., 2012), we expect homeowners to spend larger shares of their income for heating. 
2 When talking about homeowners and tenants, we mean homeowners living in their own home and ten-
ants living in a rented apartment or house.
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However, when it comes to increasing heating energy effi  ciency, affl  uent homeowners 
can make the choice to invest in energy effi  cient technology or make their building 
more energy effi  cient by exchanging old windows or insulating the building’s roof or 
outer walls. With tenants, a principal-agent problem between the tenants (principal) 
and landlords (agent) arises. Th e agent is able to make decisions that impact the prin-
cipal: It is the landlord’s decision whether a new heating system or new windows are 
installed in rented fl ats. In the case where the landlord does not invest, the tenant is 
left with reducing the indoor temperatures if lower heating costs in the apartment are 
sought.3 Th at is, homeowners have more opportunities to invest in the energy effi  ciency 
of their home or heating systems as there is no principal-agent problem. Furthermore, 
the tenant cannot invest in profound energy saving refurbishment while the owner has 
no strong incentive to invest in rented apartments since the tenant reaps most of the 
profi t of the energy savings (Kossmann et al., 2016). 
Th e aspects laid out above implicate that homeowners should have larger elasticities 
than tenants. Th is is also our fi rst hypothesis. However, as previous studies showed, 
homeowners in fact have lower elasticities than tenants. In the next part we will there-
fore discuss possible explanations for this discrepancy by laying out other factors infl u-
encing the price elasticity of a household independent of the ownership structure. 
First, households with high levels of energy consumption in kWh per square meter have 
better reduction potentials. In line with the law of diminishing marginal utility and H. 
H. Gossen’s First Law, the fi rst unit in a consumption decrease yields more utility for 
households than subsequent units (Gossen, 1854). Already economizing households 
have a harder time when seeking to further reduce energy consumption. Th erefore, we 
expect households with high initial consumption levels to have higher price elasticities 
(hypothesis 2).
Similarly, conforming to Engel’s law, low income households have to spend higher 
shares of their income for heating energy, as heating energy is indispensable and hard to 
substitute in rather cold countries like Germany. Th ose households with higher levels 
of energy expenditures are under higher economic pressure for reduction than house-
holds which need to spend a smaller share of their income for heating energy. Hence 
we expect households spending higher shares of their income for heating to have higher 
elasticities (hypothesis 3).
We further postulate the eff ect of domesticity: in family or pensioner households one 
can assume that the inhabitants are at home more often and longer than a household 
with a single working person. Th e energy consumption of households fl uctuates with 
the life cycle and associated daily schedules of household members. Whereas a fam-
ily with small children has high energy consumption, households consisting of young 
working inhabitants have low levels of energy consumption (Van Raaij, and Verhallen, 
1983). Likewise, as there is no need to heat an apartment or house to a high tempera-
3 Relocating due to high heating costs in Germany is mostly uneconomic due to price regulations which 
hamper rent increases during existing contracts.
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ture if nobody is at home, households with lower levels of domesticity can reduce their 
heating demand by heating less during their absence by relying, for example, on timer 
switches. Households with children or elderly persons with high levels of domesticity 
however cannot reduce the heating demand without having to accept lower indoor tem-
peratures, i.e. a loss in comfort. We therefore postulate that high levels of domesticity 
result in households reacting less to heating energy price increases (hypothesis 4).
Further, we hypothesize that the diff erence in elasticities between homeowners and tenants 
can be attributed to diff erent building types. As tenants live in residential buildings and 
homeowners inhabit detached buildings for the most part, we postulate that the diff erence 
in elasticity between homeowners and tenants is rather the eff ect of these building types. 
More specifi cally, we expect that inhabitants of large residential buildings have the highest 
elasticities as it is easier to economize in large residential buildings which cool down much 
slower than detached houses due to a better sa:v ratio (hypothesis 5). 
After a description of the data used and the statistical methods employed in the next 
section, heating price elasticities are computed and the hypotheses derived above will 
be tested in section 4.
3. DATA & METHODOLOGY
For this study data was drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to 
examine heating price elasticities for households in Germany. Th is longitudinal panel 
data set, initiated in 1984, contains data at the individual and household level. Al-
though the GSOEP data was available long before 1998, the data was limited as the 
households’ heating type was surveyed for the fi rst time in 1998. For the analysis, the 
majority of data is derived from the household questionnaire. Additionally, some rele-
vant variables from the individual questionnaire were merged with the household data. 
We further expanded the GSOEP data with publicly available data: heating degree days 
for Germany (Eurostat, 2016) in order to control for climatic eff ects between years, and 
annual energy prices for Germany according to the heating type, namely oil, gas, district 
heating and electricity (BMWi, 2014).
A limitation of the data used in this study is that it does not include measures for he-
ating consumption. Instead, only annual heating costs are surveyed. Th erefore, costs 
were converted into heating consumption by dividing the reported costs with the annu-
al energy prices with respect to the type of heating. Th is procedure leads to inaccurate 
values, as it is not distinguishable if additional payments by tenants are included or if 
homeowners buy a larger amount of oil when it is cheaper or a smaller amount when it 
is expensive. Moreover, energy prices also diff er across Germany.
Particular attention is also paid in the case of households relocating. As a relocation is 
immediately connected with changes in the energy demand of homes, this case needs to 
be avoided because it would distort the price elasticity of the households. In the 14 years 
included in this panel, the relocation of households is not unlikely. However, excluding 
these households would result in massive data loss. Th erefore, relocated households are 
assigned a new household ID after a relocation, thus they are treated as a new case.
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3.1. Panel data set
After excluding implausible values with respect to the heating consumption, living spa-
ce and household income, the panel data set consists of 102808 observations. A panel 
data set makes the application of a panel data regression model, in this case a fi xed eff e-
cts regression, reasonable. A fi xed eff ects model is particularly suited here as it controls 
for unobserved heterogeneity between households (Wooldridge, 2013).4 Table 1 gives 
an overview of the variables included in the fi xed eff ects regressions. Th e net equivalen-
ce income is computed with the square root scale used in recent OECD publications 
(OECD, 2012).
Table 1. Defi nition of variables and descriptive statistics: panel data set (GSOEP, 2015)
Variable defi nition Variable name Mean SD
Annual heating energy consumption incl. domestic 
hot water in kWh Q 19444 10742
Energy price in cent/kWh EP 6.33 4.04
Monthly net equivalence income in € NEI 1577 1152
Household size HHS 2.4 1.2
Heating degree days HDD 3066.52 193.84
Th e analyses and results in this study are divided into two parts. In the fi rst part (4.1), 
price elasticities of demand are computed with fi xed eff ects models by using the double 
logarithmic function, e.g. taking the logarithm of the energy consumption and the 
energy price (Wooldridge, 2013; Madlener and Hauertmann, 2011; Baker et al., 1989). 
Th e infl uence of the economies of scale eff ect is also important when it comes to heating 
energy consumption. Smaller households have lower overall, but higher per capita con-
sumption. Referring to Nässén, the square root of the household size therefore is taken 
into the regression (Nässén, 2014).
Th e heating energy price elasticity in the fi xed eff ects model with robust standard errors 
is specifi ed as follows: 
log (Qit )= b0+ bEP·log (EPit )+bNEI·log (NEIit)+ bHDD·(HDDit)+bHHS·(√HHSit)+ ai+ uit,
with i = 1,...,N households and t = 1,...,T time periods. As time-constant variables 
cannot be controlled for in the fi xed eff ects model, separate regressions for homeowners 
and tenants as well as for diff erent building types and household types are performed. 
Four building types were distinguished: detached houses, semidetached houses, residen-
tial buildings with 3-8 fl ats, and residential buildings with more than 9 fl ats. Th e ho-
usehold types consist of single-person households, family households, and households 
consisting of two persons. Regarding the distribution of tenants and homeowners, the 
GSOEP shows that homeowners to a great extent occupy detached houses whereas 
4 Th e Hausman specifi cation test favours the fi xed eff ects model over the random eff ects model. 
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tenants for the most part live in residential buildings. In addition, homeowners respecti-
vely occupants of detached houses are often families or pensioners. Th e share of families 
living in detached houses adds up to 65%, whereas only about 25% of singles under the 
age of 60 live in detached houses. Looking at the ownership structure, about 60% of the 
families and 41% of pensioners living alone are owners, whereas singles under the age of 
60 are tenants with a share of nearly 82% (GSOEP, 2015).
3.2. Cross-sectional data set
In order to control for time-invariant variables subsequent to the fi xed eff ects regression, 
the panel data set is reduced to a cross-sectional data set to perform an OLS regression 
in section 4.2. Th e ambition of the OLS regression is to control for time-invariant 
variables in order to further examine the diff erences in price elasticities between homeo-
wners and tenants. For each household a price elasticity with respect to the household’s 
heating system is computed by dividing the quantity changes averaged over three years 
with the price changes averaged over three years. Th ree year averages were used, as this 
reduces the likelihood that single very low or very high consumption distorts the hou-
sehold’s consumption.
By confl ating time and excluding households not long enough in the panel (minimum 
3 years), the original size of observations in the panel data set is reduced from 102808 
to 4235 observations. 
More time-invariant variables have been included in the OLS regression. In order to 
control for domesticity, we include the household’s electricity costs, assuming that high 
electricity costs imply regular presence in the household. Th e household size is also 
included as we suppose that the likelihood of persons being present in the household 
increases with the household size. Th e heat energy consumption per m² in kWh was 
computed by calculating the mean of the fi rst three panel years of heating energy con-
sumption. Th e underlying assumption is that households with high initial heating con-
sumption have better reduction potentials. Similarly, the share of energy expenses of the 
household’s budget was computed by averaging over the fi rst three panel years in which 
the household was present. Besides the variables listed in Table 2, the building and hea-
ting type have been included as dummy variables in the OLS regressions.
Table 2. Defi nition of variables and descriptive statistics: OLS data set (GSOEP, 2015)
Variable defi nition Variable name Mean SD
Price elasticity PE -0.14 0.47
Living space in m² Space 107.5 43.1
Monthly electricity expenditures in € Electricity 68.9 27.2
Mean heat energy consumption/m² in kWh fi rst 3 
panel years Consumption 215.3 94.6
Mean energy expenses/household budget in € fi rst 3 
panel years Expenses 0.05 0.03
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Th e price elasticity in the cross-sectional data set is -0.14. Figure 1 displays a wide range 
of price elasticities for households and one can immediately see that many households 
even have positive price elasticities, i.e. as prices rise, heating consumption rises.
Figure 1. Histogram of the space heating price elasticity of households (GSOEP, 2015)
Although this is not to be expected from a theoretical point of view, several factors could 
contribute to this result. For instance, the birth of a child frequently increases energy 
consumption just as one’s retirement increases energy consumption caused by higher 
domesticity levels. 
Table 3. Correlation table of relevant variables in cross-sectional data set (GSOEP, 2015)
PE Tenant HHS NEI Space Build. Electr. Cons. Expens.
PE 1.0000
Tenant -0.0711*** 1.0000
HHS 0.0255* -0.2310*** 1.0000
NEI -0.0168 -0.2301*** -0.0205 1.0000
Space 0.0442*** -0.5350*** 0.3780*** 0.4019*** 1.0000
Build. -0.0762*** 0.6154*** -0.2534*** -0.1345*** -0.5201*** 1.0000
Electr. 0.0918*** -0.3168*** 0.5487*** 0.1919*** 0.4606*** -0.3846*** 1.0000
Cons. -0.2837*** 0.1384*** -0.0909*** -0.1009*** -0.3182*** 0.0581*** -0.0420*** 1.0000
Expens. -0.1725*** -0.0259* 0.1758*** -0.4407*** 0.0063 -0.1687*** 0.1310*** 0.3555 1.0000* 
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Furthermore, it is a fact that households have diffi  culties when it comes to understan-
ding and documenting expenses and consumption for electricity and heating, meaning 
that erratic values cannot be ruled out (RWI, 2013). Table 3 shows the correlation table 
from the cross-sectional data set for relevant variables used in the OLS regressions.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Fixed eff ects regression results
First we present space heating price elasticities which were computed according to the 
model introduced in section 3. We calculate the fi xed eff ects model for all households 
and for homeowners and tenants separately, as this eff ect is of particular importance here. 
Table 4. Fixed eff ects regression model: Space heating energy price elasticities (GSOEP, 
2015)
Dep. Var.: log Q All Owners Tenants
Log EP -0.313*** -0.257*** -0.421***
(-43.95) (-30.00) (-34.42)
Log NEI 0.0363*** 0.0365*** 0.0350**
(5.43) (4.32) (3.25)
HHS 0.0919*** 0.0976*** 0.106***
(7.38) (6.16) (5.22)
HDD 0.0000608*** 0.0000899*** 0.0000181
(10.69) (13.54) (1.79)
Constant 4.365*** 4.267*** 4.592***
(72.46) (55.51) (48.41)
Observations 98052 53357 44695
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.054 0.065
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Th e space heating price elasticity for all households in our model is -0.31. Th is result 
is comparable to other studies from various countries which report price elasticities for 
heating energy in the range of -0.15 to -0.5 (Baker et al, 1989; Guertin et al. 2003; 
Halvorsen and Larsen, 2001; Hanemann et al., 2013; Nesbakken, 2001). 
Also in line with the results from previous studies, we fi nd higher heating energy price 
elasticity for tenants with a coeffi  cient of -0.421 in comparison to owners with a price 
elasticity of -0.257. Th e household income elasticity amounts to 0.036 for homeowners 
and 0.035 for tenants. Our fi rst hypothesis thus has to be rejected: tenants have higher 
elasticities than owners. Madlener and Hauertmann (2011) reported price elasticities of 
-0.39 for tenants and -0.12 for owners. Although the authors used the GSOEP data as 
well, not only their considered time period but also their model specifi cation diff ers to 
some extent from the approach in this study, which explains the diff erences in the price 
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elasticities. Meier and Rehdanz (2010) found even greater diff erences between tenants 
and homeowners with British household data, more precisely an elasticity of -0.19 for 
owners and -0.64 for tenants in the period of 1991 to 2005. In principle, our price 
elasticity measures are thus comparable to the results from other research, as the fi nding 
always is that tenants have much higher price elasticities than owners.5
As laid out in section 2, homeowners and tenants are unequally distributed to diff erent 
building types, with tenants living more often in residential buildings while owners 
prevalently occupy detached houses. Moreover, homeowners and tenants are unequally 
distributed to diff erent household types, with single-person households living mostly in 
rented apartments. We therefore postulated an infl uence on the price elasticity of hou-
seholds according to the inhabited building type and to domesticity (hypotheses 4 & 5). 
First, the correlation table (Table 3) shows that the coeffi  cient for the household size is 
positive, meaning that an increase in the household size within the household decreases 
the price elasticity. Th is fi nding points towards the domesticity hypothesis, as the chan-
ce for high presence in the household increases with household size. Next, elasticities are 
computed for diff erent household types in order to further test the domesticity hypo-
thesis. We run the regression for three household types, namely single person, couples 
and family households. Th e resulting price elasticities are summed up in Table 5.
Table 5. Fixed eff ects regression results: space heating energy price elasticities: household 
types (GSOEP, 2015)
Household type Single-person Couples Family
Price elasticity -0.384 -0.309 -0.263
In line with our fourth hypothesis (high levels of domesticity reduce a household’s price 
elasticity), the price elasticities reported in Table 5 vary between diff erent household 
types. It is apparent that the household type infl uences the extent of households reacting 
to price changes: whilst families were found to have the lowest price elasticity, persons 
living alone have the highest price elasticity. Next we test whether the diff erence in the 
price elasticity for owners and tenants as well as for the diff erent household types is also 
refl ected in the building types (hypothesis 5).







Residential building  
(> 9 fl ats)
Price elasticity -0.251 -0.260 -0.415 -0.429
5 Th e minor diff erences in the magnitude result from the volatility of heating expenditures in the GSOEP. 
Th us slight diff erences in the model specifi cation or in the chosen time frame have some impact.
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Th e regression results of the fi xed eff ects regression summed up in Table 6 for four dif-
ferent building types corroborate the supposition that the diff erent price elasticities for 
homeowners and tenants could be an eff ect of the building types inhabited by the two 
groups. As the regression results show, price elasticity is lowest for detached houses and 
highest for residential buildings with more than 9 fl ats. Moreover, one can see the over-
all trend that the household price elasticity rises with the size of the inhabited building. 
To conclude, based on the fi xed eff ects regression analysis, the fi rst hypothesis must be 
rejected: in line with the studies from Madlener and Hauertmann (2011) and Meier 
and Rehdanz (2010), homeowners indeed have lower elasticities. Th e fourth and fi fth 
hypothesis, however, cannot be rejected. Household size and household type, i.e. in-
dicators for domesticity, seem to have a signifi cant infl uence on the price elasticity of 
households. Moreover, the eff ect with regard to the price elasticity according to the 
building type is obvious, so that the diff erence in the price elasticity between homeown-
ers and tenants could simply be the eff ect of the inhabited building types.
Th e fi xed eff ects model specifi cation, however, is not eligible when one wants to control 
for time-invariant variables in a regression, such as building or often also household 
types. In order to check the robustness of the results obtained above and test the other 
formulated hypotheses, we transformed the panel data set to a cross section data set and 
performed OLS regressions. 
OLS regression results 
Th e mean price elasticity computed in the cross-sectional data set is lower than the 
price elasticity computed with the fi xed eff ects model for the panel data set. Th e fi xed 
eff ects regression computes the price elasticity on the household level, thus the change 
in heat energy consumption and energy costs for the specifi c timeframe. By dividing the 
quantity change with the price change for each household we approximately replicated 
the fi xed eff ects regression. However, whereas the fi xed eff ects regression includes every 
year into the computation, we used three-year averages for the calculation in Stata. Th is 
varying procedure most likely leads to the diff ering price elasticities. However, when 
looking at the price elasticity separately for tenants and owners, the diff erence between 
this groups still exists. Th e price elasticity for owners is with a mean of -0.12 lower than 
the price elasticity for tenants with an average of -0.19. Regarding the following OLS 
regressions, the wide range of household price elasticity, i.e. the dependent variable, 
results in a rather low R-squared. Low correlations between the dependant variable 
and the independent variables used for the OLS regressions can already be seen in the 
correlation table (Table 3). We attribute the high variation in the price elasticity partly 
to the fact that we used heating costs reported by the households to compute con-
sumption instead of gathered measures for the actual heating consumption. Although 
this is regrettable, no panel dataset exists with this information for German households. 
Th e OLS regression models were calculated with robust standard errors. Explanatory 
variables were added in a stepwise procedure in order to test the formulated hypotheses. 
Table 7 shows the regression results for fi ve model specifi cations. 
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Table 7. OLS regression model (GSOEP, 2015)
Dep. Var.: Price 
elasticity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tenant, Ref: 
Owner -0.0731
*** -0.0415** -0.0651*** -0.0405* -0.0259
(-4.54) (-2.69) (-4.11) (-2.49) (-1.17)
NEI -0.0000155* -0.0000251*** -0.0000541*** -0.0000717*** -0.0000401***
(-2.08) (-3.36) (-5.96) (-7.52) (-3.95)
Consumption -0.00142*** -0.00117*** -0.00116*** -0.00165***
(-17.03) (-12.50) (-12.25) (-14.25)








Building type, Ref: detached house
Semidetached house -0.0701***
(-3.71)
Residential building 3-8 fl ats -0.0895***
(-3.76)
Residential building > 9 fl ats -0.130***
(-4.18)







Constant -0.0932*** 0.217*** 0.347*** 0.355*** 0.594***
(-6.12) (8.51) (11.44) (7.75) (11.63)
Observations 3994 3994 3994 3994 3994
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.083 0.097 0.114 0.128
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Model 1 tests if a diff erence exists in the price elasticity between owners and tenants, 
whilst income is controlled for. Here, the diff erence between homeowners and tenants 
heating price elasticity is signifi cant (p < 0.001). Just like in the fi xed eff ects model, te-
nants have higher price elasticity than owners, the fi rst hypothesis (owners have higher 
elasticities than tenants) thus has to be rejected. 
As we postulated that the price elasticity is dependent on the initial heat consumption 
of a household, we included the amount of heat consumption in kWh from the fi rst 
three years in which the household was present in the panel in model 2. Th e eff ect of 
the household’s initial energy consumption is negative. Th us, the higher the initial heat 
energy consumption of the household at the beginning of the panel, the higher its price 
elasticity. Th is fi nding supports our second hypothesis, according to which households 
with high initial consumption levels have higher price elasticities.
It bears mentioning that the R-squared of the model increases heavily when the initial 
heat consumption is included into the model. Also, the diff erence in the price elasticity 
between tenants and homeowners becomes smaller. In model 3 we further include the 
variable for the household’s expenses in order to test our third hypothesis, i.e. that hou-
seholds spending a higher share of their income for heating have higher elasticities. Th e 
negative coeffi  cient for the heating expenses of households indicates that high initial 
energy expenses indeed give rise to higher price elasticities.
Model 4 shows what happens to the diff erence in price elasticity if indicators for the ho-
usehold’s domesticity, i.e. the household size and the electricity costs, are included. Th e 
diff erence in price elasticity between tenants and owners becomes smaller and it is now 
only signifi cant on the 5% level of confi dence. Th e positive coeffi  cient for the electricity 
costs implies that high electricity costs come along with lower price elasticities, which 
supports the fourth hypothesis, namely that high domesticity results in lower price ela-
sticities. Th e eff ect for the household size is negative, which is rather counterintuitive as 
we postulated the domesticity eff ect and one could suppose that domesticity rises with 
the household size. Here, the electricity costs most likely already control for the house-
hold size and domesticity, as the household size has a positive coeffi  cient in the correla-
tion table (Table 3), and the regression from model 4 without the electricity costs of the 
household yields a positive eff ect of the household size as well (not shown in Table 7). 
To test the building type hypothesis, building type, living space and fuel type are inc-
luded to the regression in our last model. Th e negative coeffi  cient for the household’s 
living space indicates that the larger the living space, the higher the price elasticity. Th is 
is because large living spaces allow for more possibilities to reduce room temperatures in 
parts of the dwelling. Furthermore, the building type itself has a signifi cant eff ect: just 
like in the fi xed eff ects regressions (Table 6), the higher the price elasticity is, the more 
compact the occupied building is. Th e coeffi  cients for the heating type show that the 
price elasticity is lowest for households heating with oil. Although we cannot test this 
with the data available to us, this fi nding could be due to the fact that households hea-
ting with oil have a rather low level of feedback as there is no metering in kWh. Further, 
houses which are heated with oil are mostly older detached houses, which cool down 
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faster than newer compact buildings, thus limiting the energy consumption reduction 
potential.
Finally, the diff erence in the price elasticity between homeowners and tenants is now 
no longer statistically signifi cant. We can therefore conclude that the diff erence in ela-
sticities between homeowners and tenants nearly vanish when we control for the initial 
level of energy consumption, the magnitude of the household’s heating energy expenses 
in the fi rst three panel years, the household’s domesticity measured by electricity costs, 
and building type characteristics. 
Th e decisive factor according to the high t-statistic and the jump in the coeffi  cient of 
determination is the household’s initial level of consumption in model 2. We therefore 
look at this variable more precisely. Figure 2 shows that the price elasticity increases with 
the initial level of the household’s heating consumption. 
Figure 2. Locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (lowess) for the price elasticity subject to the 
household’s consumption/m² in kWh for the fi rst 3 panel years (GSOEP, 2015)
Figure 3 and 4 further demonstrates how the heating consumption developed between 
1998 and 2012 for tenants and owners as well as for residential and detached buildings.6
6 Annual energy prices vary stronger than the heating costs reported by the households. Peaks or drops in 
consumption therefore arise from the estimation of the household’s consumption by dividing the reported 
costs with the annual energy prices with respect to the type of heating. 
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Fig ure 3. and 4. Consumption by ownership and building type from 1998-2012 (GSOEP, 
2015)
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It is apparent how the consumption for tenants in fi gure 3 looks nearly the same as 
the consumption for inhabitants of residential buildings in fi gure 4. Th e same holds 
for owners and detached buildings. As seen in the OLS regression, tenants have higher 
initial consumptions in kWh per square meter compared to owners. Residential buil-
dings also have the highest consumption in kWh per square meter until the year 2001. 
Looking at the consumption in kWh per capita, however, the initial consumption level 
is higher for owners than for tenants, just like the initial consumption level per capita 
of inhabitants of detached buildings is higher than the consumption per capita of re-
sidential building inhabitants. Moreover, the per capita consumption for homeowners 
and inhabitants of detached buildings is the only one not decreasing over the time span 
considered here. Th is is partly attributable to higher per capita living spaces.7 In com-
parison to homeowners, tenants started from a high initial consumption but decreased 
their consumption greater than homeowners.
Th e rising rather than declining consumption per capita for homeowners or inhabitants 
of detached buildings is especially essential. Regarding policy goals to reduce overall 
CO2 emissions in the residential sector, the results above indicate that price signals and 
subsidies seem to fail at least for homeowners and inhabitants of detached houses. Th is 
is in line with the fact that there are diff erent refurbishment rates for detached houses 
and residential buildings in Germany. Concerning the energetic refurbishment rate of 
buildings, they are especially higher in residential buildings than in detached houses 
(Stieß et al., 2010). Th is is reinforced by the fact that by refurbishing, owners of smaller 
residential buildings achieved energy effi  ciency increases of approximately 15% whe-
reas owners of large residential buildings achieved energy effi  ciency increases of 32%. 
Rosenschon et al. (2011) explain this result with the advantage for owners of large resi-
dential buildings with regard to more experience with energetic refurbishments. In line 
with Coase’s (1937) theory, owners of large residential buildings have lower transaction 
costs and higher economies of scale eff ects. Owners of small residential buildings also 
often lack the solvency to invest in their building. Furthermore, the payback period 
often exceeds the owner’s life expectancy (Stieß et al., 2010; Rosenschon et al., 2011). 
Th e studies from Madlener and Hauertmann (2011) and Meier and Rehdanz (2010), 
as well as this study, did not control for the refurbishment of a building, as this data is 
not available. If residential buildings were refurbished to a greater extent than detached 
houses in the considered period, occupants of residential buildings, i.e. mostly tenants, 
reduced their energy consumption more than occupants of detached houses. Th us, the 
higher price elasticity of tenants could also be an eff ect of the higher refurbishment rates 
of residential buildings. Figure 3 and 4 support this thought. 
Moreover, the surface-to-volume ratio (sa:v) might be another factor, i.e. in buildings 
with a small sa:v ratio (residential buildings), the warmth diff uses to a larger proportion 
due to ventilation than in detached houses, where a larger share of the total heat loss di-
ff uses through the surface (large sa:v ratio) (Bettencourt et al., 2007). Reducing the ven-
7 Per capita living space for homeowners increased 14 m² on average from 1998 to 2012. Th e average 
household size of homeowners was 2.85 in 1998 and 2.38 in 2012 (GSOEP, 2015). 
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tilation (shorter periods or less frequent ventilation) therefore leads to higher savings in 
residential buildings than in detached houses. Also, reducing the ventilation normally 
goes along with a smaller loss in comfort compared to reducing the indoor temperature. 
Th us, if all households would seek to reduce the heating energy demand by reducing the 
ventilation, the occupants of residential buildings, i.e. mostly tenants, would achieve 
higher savings in relation to their initial value than occupants of detached houses. Un-
fortunately, these two thoughts cannot be tested with the available data. 
5. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Until now the counterintuitive diff erences in the price elasticities of tenants and home 
owners were not explained in the literature. Tenants were found to have higher price 
elasticities than owners. After laying out why one would expect this to be the other 
way around, i.e. owners having higher elasticities than tenants, we searched for aspects 
which could explain the fi nding.
We postulated that the eff ect is partly generated by the fact that owners and tenants are 
distributed unequally to building and household types. Th is implies varying initial hea-
ting consumption and levels of energy expenditures. We assumed that households with 
high initial consumptions and / or high energy expenditures should have higher price 
elasticities from a microeconomic point of view. Furthermore, we associated diff erent 
levels of domesticity and thus varying possibilities of reducing heating costs by reducing 
the indoor temperature according to the building and heating types.
In order to test our hypothesis, we performed fi xed eff ects and OLS regressions with 
German panel data from the GSOEP. We obtained similar results compared to other 
studies, i.e. tenants having higher elasticities than owners. Moreover, the price elasticity 
according to the fi xed eff ects regression varies for various building and household types. 
With the objective to further explain these fi ndings, the price elasticity for each house-
hold was computed and used as a dependent variable in an OLS regression. Th e OLS 
regression supports the preliminary results from the fi xed eff ects regression for diff erent 
building types and household types: Th e diff erences in price elasticity are mostly not 
due to diff erent attitudes towards rising energy prices between tenants and homeowners. 
Rather this eff ect is generated by a set of characteristics diff ering between tenants and 
homeowners, such as domesticity and initial levels of heating energy consumption and 
expenses, which themselves are linked to diff erent building types and to the ownership 
structure. We showed that tenants had higher initial heating energy consumption per 
square meter than homeowners, but reduced their consumption per square meter more 
than homeowners, who started at a lower level. Th is explains the diff ering elasticities, 
which could be the outcome of diff ering refurbishment rates and eff ects resulting from 
building physics, i.e. varying eff ects on energy saving when reducing ventilation, for 
instance. Due to missing data, we could not test these assumptions. 
Even though the results in our study are in line with those from other studies, the 
estimation of the household consumption lacks accuracy. More precise data, especially 
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fi gures for the real heating consumption of households according to their bills, would 
be preferable. Also, more information on the domesticity, e.g. information about the 
presence at home for each household member, would facilitate the measurement of 
domesticity levels.
One policy implication can be drawn from the results of this study. As homeowners, 
respectively inhabitants of detached houses, have comparatively small heating energy 
price elasticities, reduction policies should have a stronger focus on this group. Th is is 
not only important because they were found to have smaller elasticities, but also because 
they consume more energy per capita for space heating due to larger dwelling sizes. Th e 
fact that dwelling sizes are steadily increasing while household sizes are decreasing in the 
case of homeowners makes this group a highly relevant target to tackle when seeking to 
reduce CO2 emissions in the residential sector. 
Th ere are already a wide variety of consulting services for owners of detached houses 
seeking to invest in their home in Germany. Th e fact that refurbishment nevertheless 
rarely takes place for this group is often due to a lack of money, expertise, but also long-
term perspective (Stieß et al., 2010). Old detached houses which are often inhabited 
by senior citizens living alone should therefore be especially assisted. For assistance, we 
would propose the foundation of refurbishment trusts: Such a trust would undertake 
all necessary investment and management for refurbishment and the homeowner would 
give the money for the resulting energy savings to the trust in return. Whilst nothing 
really changes for the owner with regard to heating expenses, this would be benefi cial 
for the environment as energy could be saved and CO2 emissions would be reduced. 
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POTROŠNJA GRIJANJA U STAMBENOM SEKTORU: SLABA 
ELASTIČNOST POTROŠNJE KOD KUĆEVLASNIKA
Ines Weber i Bernhard Gill
Sažetak
U ovom su radu predstavljeni rezultati istraživanja o elastičnosti troškova zagrijavanja domaćinstava u 
Njemačkoj. Pri interpretaciji rezultata koriste se i podaci iz prijašnjih studija o razlikama u elastičnosti 
potrošnje kod kućevlasnika i zakupaca. Koristeći panel-podatke iz GSOEP-a (Njemački socio-ekonomski 
panel), pomoću metode fi ksnih učinaka i OLS regresije istražili smo faktore o kojima ovisi razlika između 
kućevlasnika i zakupaca u elastičnosti cijene grijanja. Naši rezultati upućuju na zaključak da elastičnost 
cijene grijanja uvelike ovisi o početnoj različitoj količini potrošnje kod kućevlasnika i zakupaca. 
Bolje razumijevanje načina na koji domaćinstva reagiraju na povećanje cijena energenata, uzimajući u 
obzir razlike između vrsta domaćinstava te početnu količinu potrošnje i iznos troškova, korisno je u obliko-
vanju ciljanih mjera za smanjenje emisija CO2. Pokazali smo da je najviša potrošnja energije za grijanje 
kod vlasnika kuća, i to samostojećih kuća, što se kroz posljednjih nekoliko godina još i dodatno povećavalo. 
To dovodi do slabije elastičnosti cijena za one koji posjeduju vlastitu kuću u odnosu na zakupce. Politika 
redukcije stoga treba biti snažnije usmjerena na kućevlasnike samostojećih kuća. 
Ključne riječi: grijanje prostora, elastičnost cijena, Njemačka, agencijska teorija, poticaji za štednju, poti-
caji za obnovu
HEIZUNGSVERBRAUCH IM WOHNSEKTOR: EINE SCHWACHE 
VERBRAUCHSELASTIZITÄT BEI HAUSEIGENTÜMERN
Ines Weber und Bernhard Gill
Zusammenfassung
In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden die Forschungsergebnisse zur Kostenelastizität der Raumbeheizung von 
Haushalten in Deutschland dargestellt. Bei der Interpretation der Ergebnisse werden auch Daten as den 
vorherigen Studien über Unterschiede bei der Verbrauchselastizität zwischen Hauseigentümern und Mie-
tern genutzt. Mit Hilfe der Daten vom GSOEP (German Socio-Economic Panel ), der Methode mit fi xen 
Eff ekten und der OLS-Regression haben wir die Faktoren untersucht, von denen der Unterschied zwischen 
Hauseigentümern und Mietern bei der Preiselastizität der Heizung abhängt. Unsere Resultate weisen auf 
den Schluss hin, dass die Preiselastizität der Heizung im großen Maße vom unterschiedlichen Anfangsver-
brauch bei Hauseigentümern und Mietern abhängt. 
Das Verständnis der Reaktion von Haushalten auf die Energenten-Preissteigerung, mit Rücksicht auf die 
unterschiedlichen Arten der Haushalte, den Anfangsverbrauch und die Kostensumme, ist nützlich bei der 
Gestaltung von gezielten Maßnahmen zur Reduktion der CO2 Emissionen. Wir haben gezeigt, dass Hause-
igentümer und zwar diejenigen von Einfamilienhäusern den höchsten Heizungsverbrauch haben, was sich 
in den letzten Jahren noch gesteigert hat. Das bringt zu einer schwächeren Preiselastizität für Hauseigen-
tümer im Vergleich zu den Mietern. Die Reduktionspolitik sollte sich deshalb stärker auf Eigentümer von 
Einfamilienhäusern ausrichten.
Schlüsselwörter: Raumheizung, Preiselastizität, Deutschland, Agenturtheorie, Sparsubventionen, Reno-
vierungssubventionen
